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The objective of this study was to analyze the implicit use of relative performance evaluation 
in BM&FBovespa listed companies as a way to measure the remuneration of its executives. To define the 
sample, we sought to identify companies that disclosed information about the compensation of their exec-
utives between 2009 and 2012, totaling the sample size in 67 companies, totaling 112 observations. They 
were then categorized in order to capture risk sharing as predicted by the theory of relative performance 
evaluation. The results of this research indicate a strong asymmetry in the distribution of the compensa-
tion, mainly due to the long-term compensation, which caused the occurrence of outliers. As a result of 
this situation, and following studies already developed, it was decided to test the model through quantile 
regression. Even with the use of the median regression it was not possible to identify statistically signifi-
cant evidences of the occurrence of relative performance evaluation, therefore, there is no evidence that 
the variation of the result of the sector reduces the impacts that the results obtained by the organizations 
exercise on the executive remuneration.
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Resumo
	 O	objetivo	deste	estudo	foi	analisar	o	uso	implícito	de	avaliação	relativa	de	desempenho	em	em-
presas	listadas	na	BM&FBovespa	como	forma	de	aferir	a	remuneração	de	seus	executivos.	Para	defini-
ção	da	amostra	buscou-se	identificar	empresas	que	divulgaram	as	informações	acerca	da	remuneração	
de	seus	executivos	entre	os	anos	de	2009	a	2012,	totalizando	o	tamanho	da	amostra	em	67	empresas,	
totalizando	112	observações.	Em	seguida,	elas	foram	classificadas	setorialmente	de	forma	a	capturar	o	
compartilhamento	do	risco	conforme	prediz	a	teoria	da	avaliação	relativa	de	desempenho.	Os	resultados	
desta	pesquisa	indicam	uma	forte	assimetria	da	distribuição	da	compensação	decorrente,	principalmen-
te,	da	compensação	de	longo-prazo,	o	que	ocasionou	a	ocorrência	de	outliers.	Como	decorrência	de	tal	
situação,	e	seguindo	estudos	já	desenvolvidos,	optou-se	por	testar	o	modelo	por	meio	de	regressão	quan-
tílica.	Mesmo	com	o	uso	da	regressão	mediana	não	foi	possível	identificar	evidências	estatisticamente	
significantes	da	ocorrência	de	avaliação	relativa	de	desempenho,	logo,	não	há	evidências	de	que	a	va-
riação	do	resultado	do	setor	reduza	os	impactos	que	os	resultados	auferidos	pelas	organizações	exercem	
sobre	a	remuneração	executiva.
 Palavras-chave: Remuneração	a	Executivos;	Avaliação	Relativa	de	Desempenho;	Conflito	de	Agência.
	 Códigos	JEL:	M12,	L25,	D74
1 intRoduction
Studies in Finance (AGGARWAL; SANWICK, 1999; LIU; STARK, 2009; ALBUQUERQUE, 
2009; ALBUQUERQUE; DE FRANCO; VERDI, 2013) point out that the market looks for ways to 
evaluate executives as a way for obtain firms organizational performance information. This eval-
uation would make the investment decisions more robust, besides allowing a better perception 
about the information production by the firms. (SCOTT, 2009).
Discussions about the form and types of executive compensation have gained momentum 
since the 1980s (MURPHY, 1999) and have intensified after economic scandals involving insider 
trading in recent decades (GAO, 2010). Financial crises, such as that of 2008, ended up drawing 
attention to the value of the compensation paid to key executives and the lack of information to 
the market. Murphy (1999; 2012) also highlights some of the factors that stimulated interest in 
the topic: (i) the median amount paid in cash to Chief Executive Officers (CEO) more than doubled 
between the 1970s and 1990s; (ii) the median of its total remunerations in this same period almost 
quadrupled; (iii) the so-called “excesses of the 1980s” with the perception of high wages associated 
with layoffs, closures and reductions in operations; and (iv) evidence of the linkage of the CEO’s 
compensation to the firm’s market performance. Murphy (1999; 2012) believes that this scenario 
provided a broad academic interest, as well as the outrage generated in society due to the high 
remunerations of executives of financial institutions involved in the crisis of 2008.
In treating remuneration as an agency problem, Lambert (2001) argues that the defini-
tion of manager incentives should be understood as a way of sharing risks between principal(s) 
and agent(s). What is expected is that the principal is protected from non-optimal choices of the 
agent, and that the agent, on the other hand, also has protection against industry risks and inves-
tor actions (such as non-investment decisions).
The idea of  risk sharing was explored by Holmstrom (1982) when discussing the prob-
lem of moral hazard in teams. The author addresses the problem by focusing on two aspects: 
free riding and competition. Based on these aspects, Holmstrom (1982) develops the concept of 
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE), discussing the role of aggregate measures and concluding 
that RPE provides better risk sharing. This concept states that risk can be better shared by consid-
ering the performance of the industry, together with the individual.
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Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) are among the pioneers to extend the concept of RPE to 
firms and to identify the existence of a relationship between executive compensation and the 
performance of rival firms. Similar results were also identified by Asseburg and Hoffman (2010) 
and Farmer, Archbold and Alexandrou (2013).
Although most of the research on the subject has analyzed the US market, it is possible 
to highlight the works of Joh (1999) and Liu and Stark (2009) who found evidence of the occur-
rence of RPE in Japan and the United Kingdom, respectively. In Brazil, despite more than two 
decades of the study of Holmstrom (1982), no study with the same objective has yet been found, 
consequently there is still a lack of investigation of the hypothesis of the relative performance 
evaluation in the Brazilian market.
It is believed that this lack of research is due to the non-disclosure of data on the remuner-
ation of executives of companies registered in the Brazilian market, which only came to occur from 
the CVM Instruction 480/09, which requires the annual disclosure of information about the remu-
neration of directors. So it is possible to notice that the Brazilian academy still has little evidence on 
the relations that the executives incentive formulas have with organizational and market variables, 
including the influence of the performance of the sector in the performance of the firm.
The approval of CVM Instruction 480/09 generated repercussion in the Brazilian busi-
ness environment. Based on statements by a specific group of executives linked to the Brazilian 
Institute of Finance Executives, Rio de Janeiro branch, (IBEF-RJ), some companies sought in court 
the right not to disclose the amounts paid to their executives, nor the structure of its remunera-
tion packages, in accordance with said Instruction. According to such companies, the disclosure 
of this information would pose a threat to the safety of their executives.
According to IBGC (2013), in 2012, about 55 companies refused to disclose such infor-
mation. In addition, several others present “inconsistent” information, such as: annual values 
that are zero or very low (annual compensation of the board is very low), absence of statutory 
board of directors, filling errors, among others. On the other hand, the Brazilian Securities and 
Exchange Commission (CVM) seeks means and partners to force the market to disclose this infor-
mation and provide greater transparency for shareholders.
This scenario contributes to the current lack of research in Brazil on this topic. There-
fore, this study is still justified by allowing a better understanding of the practices for defining op-
timal contracts with executives. The relative performance evaluation makes possible to exclude 
from the evaluation of the organizational result situations of luck or setback by which an econom-
ic sector may have experienced in a certain period. In this sense, it is believed that this brings 
greater confidence to the market, reducing risk, adjusting the remuneration paid as an incentive 
to executives and, as a consequence of all these factors, providing greater liquidity to the market.
Based on this scenario, the following research problem was elaborated: What evidence 
of the implicit use of relative performance evaluation in companies listed on the BM&FBovespa 
can be observed from profit, market return and cash flow?
2 liteRatuRe RevieW
According to Scott (2009), much of executive compensation theory derives from Agency 
Theory, which in turn is a derivation of Contract Theory. For Lambert (2001), during the 1980s 
and 1990s, accounting research showed greater interest in these discussions about the Agen-
cy Theory, since it allows explicit incorporation of conflicts of interest, incentive problems and 
mechanisms to control incentive problems in the developed models by researchers. For Scott 
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(2009), accounting research in this area has two basic questions: 1) how information, accounting, 
and compensation systems impact incentive problems; and 2) how the existence of incentive 
problems impact the structure and design of information, accounting and compensation systems.
The Agency Theory has been discussed in different areas, but always under the same as-
pect: the conflict of interest between two or more parties. These discussions intensified with the 
separation of control and ownership. Agency conflicts arise when a party (principal) who owns 
the property delegates to another individual (agent) the role of acting in pursuit of their interests. 
(ROSS, 1973; JENSEN & MECKLING, 1976).
The principal expects the agent to maximize his wealth and will look for ways to ensure 
that the agent behaves in a way that ensures the achievement of this goal. Despite the existence 
of controls, Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that if both seek to maximize their wealth, there 
are reasons to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal. 
Lambert (2001) states that the principal problem is based on maximizing the utility expected by 
it, subject to the agent’s acceptance of the restriction of utility and incentive compatibilities.
Ross (1973) argues that agency problems would theoretically be solved through a pay-
ment structure that solved the principal problem and led to Pareto efficiency for every utility pair 
(U, G) of the individuals involved in the conflict. However, Ross (1973) states that this can not be 
achieved because the participants should be in a perfect information environment where the 
principal would be aware of the price of each agent’s action.
Jensen and Murphy (1990) agree that the definition of an optimal contract could rem-
edy agency conflicts, but other authors disagree that this definition is possible. Merchant and 
Stede (2012) argue that there will always be variables that are not controllable (at least in part) 
in the incentive formulas and this alone would already give rise to conflicts of interest. Bebchuk 
and Fried (2003) also criticize the fact that the market (or even the state) does not regulate the 
payment of bonuses, which allows the opportunity for extraordinary gains by the managers, and 
argue that managers can influence the definition of their own remuneration, which is also suffi-
cient to believe that there is no optimum situation for all participants.
Executive compensation would then be the result of a contract between the parties 
seeking to maximize their profits. Healy (1985) gives a description of the reward trying to exclude 
situations of good or bad luck, as follows:
                                                                  (1)
Where:  = Bonus;  = Percentage of payment defined in the bonus agreement;  = up-
per limit on excess earnings over projected results; = Results disclosed;  = Lower earnings limit.
In this way, the manager will receive  in bonuses, if the gains exceed the low-
er limit and are smaller than the upper limit of the plan, . Bonuses are set at  when gains 
exceed the upper limit.
It can be seen that equation (1) presents a generalization for risk sharing, where the 
lower limit represents the risk aversion of the manager, while the upper limit would be the risk 
aversion of the principal. In this sense, Holmstrom (1982) developed the Relative Performance 
Evaluation hypothesis (RPE) for which the attribution of incentives relative to the average per-
formance of other firms in the sector would filter the systematic risk out of the incentive plan. 
Given that sectorial risks are probably uncontrollable and void of information about the agent’s 
effort, linking incentives to the difference between individual and industry performance would 
strengthen the relationship between effort and the desired performance measure in an optimal 
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contract. Thus, the RPE would be giving a positive weight to individual performance, and negative 
to sector performance. (AGGARWAL; SAMWICK, 1999; SCOTT, 2009) 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) pioneered the extrapolation of the hypothesis proposed 
by Holmstrom (1982), applying it to executives. These authors explain a scenario among compa-
nies that share a strategic competition environment, which for the authors is not captured in the 
common agency model. The work of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) is developed based on market 
competition and its implications for the definition of incentive plans. For this, market competition 
was modeled in two ways: (i) as strategic complements; or (ii) as strategic substitutes.
Joh (1999) tested how industry performance affects manager incentive contracts at 796 firms 
during the years 1968-92. Their results show that compensation would be positively related to industry 
profitability, and that this effect is greater in sectors more competitive firms and in slower growing firms.
Liu and Stark (2009) investigated the evidence of relative performance evaluation in the 
UK. The authors analyzed 169 ‘non-financial’ companies in the period 1971-1998. The measures 
used for performance were pre-tax accounting earnings and market return, while the incentive 
proxy was the cash remuneration and assumed the linearity between the variables of the model. 
Liu and Stark (2009) found evidences of positive relations with individual and negative profits 
with the sectorial one. 
Albuquerque (2009) argues that the use of relative performance evaluation in the exec-
utive compensation structure provides security against uncontrollable factors, as well as being a 
more informative measure of CEO actions. For the author the differences in the results of the em-
pirical studies that tested the RPE in the North American market are due to problems in the specifi-
cation of the pairs. The author estimated a model similar to that of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), 
using as dependent variable the executive’s total remuneration for the year, and as independent 
the return on assets (ROA), ROA variation, and market return (individual and peer-weighted per-
formance measures) and control variables such as firm size, growth options and market regulation. 
The study concludes by indicating the existence of the RPE in the North American market.
Angelis and Grinstein (2011) developed a cross-sectional study with companies listed in 
the S&P500 in 2007. The authors identified the use of RPE in more than a third of their sample, 
where on average 49% of remuneration was linked to RPE. However, not all companies used indus-
try or market indexes because they were not sure what was the best benchmark. Therefore, the lack 
of use of the RPE is due to uncertainty about the appropriate sectoral measure. This would leave 
the agent exposed to uncontrollable risks and this would reduce the effectiveness of the measure.
Gong, Li, and Shin (2011) investigated the explicit use of RPE in 1,419 listed firms in the 
US market in 2006. Twenty-five percent of the firms in the sample made such use, and a strong 
negative relationship was identified between CEO compensation and market performance for the 
industry. The study also shows that the main variable used as metrics in RPE is the market return 
(73.68% of firms in the sample) and return on the PL (13.85%).
Albuquerque, De Franco and Verdi (2013) start from the proposition of Aggarwal and 
Samwick (1999) in the development of their research, stating that the choice in the definition of 
the pairs, in order to perform the relative evaluation of performance, would represent a talent 
assessment not observed by executives. The authors tested for the years 2006-2008 a model 
that made the distinction between components of unobserved talents and self remuneration. A 
probit model was used to identify the probability of choosing a particular “pair” to perform the 
relative assessment. The article concludes by confirming that firms tend to choose as benchmark 
companies whose executives are highly remunerated and that this is due to a need to remuner-
ate talents not observed in the management of complex firms.
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The recurrence of work addressing the relative performance evaluation of executives in 
other markets may be influenced by the fact that the UK Secretary of State (2002) and the U.S. 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) (2006) indicate that relative performance evaluation is an 
important practice in the definition of the relations between the performance of the firm and the 
incentives granted to executives.
During the elaboration of this work, the existence of works involving the relative evalu-
ation of performance and compensation of executives in Brazil was not identified. On the other 
hand, there are studies that deal with the sensitivity of executive compensation to factors such as 
organizational performance and managers’ temporal orientation. Vasconcelos and Monte (2013) 
analyzed the relationship between executive compensation and financial performance of firms. 
The authors analyzed separately the average compensation of the board of directors and the 
executive board, identifying significant relationships with Return on Assets, Return on Sharehold-
ers’ Equity and Dividends per Share.
The objective of the study by Silva, Ribeiro and Matias (2013) was to examine the re-
muneration model of Brazilian financial institutions, as described in the Reference Form. The au-
thors verified that the net profit is the measure of performance most used in the institutions that 
composed their sample, followed by the return on the equity (ROE) and by qualitative measures. 
In addition, only 5 individuals in the sample remunerate their executives through stock option 
programs. According to Silva, Ribeiro and Matias (2013), net profit and ROE are goals commonly 
used in executive incentive plans.
Krauter (2013) investigated the relationship between executive compensation and the 
financial performance of Brazilian companies. The author investigated the motivational effects 
that different types of remuneration cause on performance. Her work innovates by creating ben-
efits and career aid indexes for non-pecuniary compensation.5 The results of the research reveal 
a statistically significant relationship between the types of remuneration (pecuniary or non-pecu-
niary) and financial performance.
In the research by Silva and Chien (2013), the return on assets (ROA) and the sales var-
iation did not present statistically significant relationships with the remuneration, contrary to the 
market value of the firm. Ferreira (2012) performed several tests to analyze relations between firm 
size and remuneration and did not find significant relationships. Ventura (2013) found a significant 
relationship between compensation and firm size, market value and ROE, but did not find evidence 
of significant remuneration relationships with BM&FBOVESPA’s corporate governance levels.
Aguiar (2009) also brings this discussion in his study exposing a position that the rela-
tionship of causality, in models that consider a gap between performance evaluation and com-
pensation, would be that the remuneration in year t would motivate the agent to perform better 
in year t + 1, because he rationally wishes to increase his usefulness and knows what actions he 
must choose for it. Therefore, the performance in t influences the remuneration in t, which in 
turn influences the performance in t + 1 and so on.
Board 1 presents a summary of the variables used in the surveys that constitute the 
theoretical support of this article.
Authors Dependent Variable Independent Variables
Internationals
5  Watts & Zimmerman (1986) call these types of incentives of perquisite. Its disclosure is not regulated, which creates difficulty in 
obtaining similar data.
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Aggarwall & Samwi-
ck (1999)
Short-term remuneration (salary, 
bonuses and others)
Long-term compensation (sha-
res, stock options, benefit plans, 
indemnities and others)
Value of the firm (discounted future cash flow) 
and weighted average of the return to sha-
reholders that the other firms in the industry 
provided.
Joh (1999)
Variation of the executive's total 
pecuniary remuneration from t 
-1 to t
ROA, weighted ROA, market return, weighted 
market return, time dummy.
Liu & Stark (2009) Variation of total compensation from t - 1 to t.
Time Dummies, market return of the firm, wei-
ghted average return provided by other firms 
in the industry, profit before income tax, profit 
before the weighted average income tax of 
other firms in the sector, size (billing).
Angelis & Gristein 
(2011) Total compensation
Sector Dummies, daily turnover of firm, daily 
turnover of firm, size of firm (total assets), 
Tobin's Q, proportion of new executives in the 
firm vs. sector and proportion of internal di-
rectors in the Board of Directors.
Gong, Li e Shin 
(2011) Total compensation
Stock returns, ROE, Growth of earnings, ear-
nings, Growth of sales, ROA, Cash flow.
Nationals*
Silva & Chien (2013)
Price-to-Book
ROA
Annual average sales growth
Total and average remuneration, level of go-
vernance, percentage of voting capital of the 
controlling shareholder, percentage of the 
total capital of the controlling shareholder, le-
verage, size (total assets), tangible assets.
Ferreira (2012) Percentage change in total com-pensation Size (total asset)
Ventura (2013) Total average remuneration
Size (total assets), dummy for share payment, 
bonus payment dummy, statutory board mem-
ber amount, share price, earnings per share, 
ROE and ROA.
Vasconcelos & Mon-
te (2013) Total compensation
ROA, ROE, net margin, EBITDA margin, ear-
nings per share, share price and dividends per 
share.
Krauter (2013) Sales growth, ROE, ROA.
Average monthly salary, average variable sa-
lary, access index to benefits, career support 
index, education incentive index.
Board 1 – Variables used in studies already developed.
Source: Self elaboration.
Thus, the hypothesis of the research was defined as a consequence of the hypothesis of 
the relative performance evaluation proposed by Holmstrom (1982) and the discussions of the 
later studies, especially that of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999):
• H1: The greater the performance of the sector, the lower the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to the firm’s unique performance.
3 metHodoloGical PRoceduRes
3.1 Specification of the model
Based on the literature review, the model described in Eq. 2 was proposed:
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  (2)
Where: ΔComp
i,t
 = average change in the total compensation of the executive board be-
tween period t-1 and period t;  = dummy variable for each year from 2009 to 2012;  = 
Value of earnings before income tax of company i in period t;  = Weighted value by sector 
of profit before income tax without considering company i in period t;  = operating cash of 
company i in period t;  = weighted value by sector of operating cash without considering 
company i in period t;  = market return of firm i in period t;  = Weighted value of the 
return of the sector without considering the company i in period t; Tam
i,t
 = Company size measured 
by the natural logarithm of the total assets of company i in period t;  = stochastic error term.
The proxy for incentives was the change in the natural logarithms of the total average 
incentives of the statutory board between periods t-1 and t, which indicates how much the com-
pensation based on the results received by the executive between two periods varied. Therefore, 
it represents a measure for the reward granted to the CEO, resulting from the effort exerted by 
him to achieve the pre-established organizational goals. This methodology is consistent with the 
work of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
The explanatory variables encompass accounting measures and market measures of per-
formance. Similar to that developed by Liu and Stark (2009), this research selected the pre-tax 
accounting earnings (Lair
i,t
) and the cash stock market return (RM
i,t
), and then a weighting of both 
measures was made for the sector including only the rival companies (LairP
i,t
 and RMP
i,t
). To ensure 
that the cash stock market return is owned by a normal distribution, varying from - ∞ to + ∞, its 
natural logarithm was calculated for the purpose of maintaining this property. A second accounting 
variable of performance was inserted: operational cash flow (CxOp
i,t
 and CxOpP
i,t
). The intention is 
to verify if a measure based on the cash basis would increase the robustness to the model.
The Weighted Stock Market Return was calculated as follows (as developed by Liu and 
Stark, 2009):
(3)
Where:  represents the weighted average return for firm i in period t;  is 
the share price of company i in period t-1;  is the market return of hypothetical company k 
in year t; and  is the share price of company k at the beginning of year t.
Weighted pre-tax accounting earnings was calculated as follows (as developed by Liu 
and Stark, 2009):
(4)
Where:  represents the weighted pre-tax accounting earnings for company i 
in period t;  is the book value of firm i in period t-1;  is the pre-tax accounting 
earnings of hypothetical firm k in period t; and  is the book value of the hypothetical firm 
k in period t-1.
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The Weighted Operational Cash Flow for company i was measured by the average of 
the operating boxes of the firms that make up the sector in which the company i is inserted, but 
disregarding the firm i. 
We also included time dummies and a control variable for size (Tam
i,t
) with the objective 
of absorbing the correlation between the measures of performance derived from unspecified 
factors. Thus, the estimators will be non-biased (AGGARWAL; SAMWICK, 1999; LIU; STARK, 2009). 
It should be noted that the use of individual variables and their weighted equivalents for the 
sector is consistent with the studies of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Liu and Stark (2009).
The variables ΔComp
i,t
; , , , , , , and Tam
i,t
 
were divided by 1,000,000 due to computational issues. If this measure were not taken, some 
algorithms may produce non-exact results. (HAYASHI, 2000)
Based on the proposed model, three regressions were tested, alternating some of the 
proposed variables, in order to investigate if there would be any difference in the fit of the model 
resulting from the chosen performance measure. For each regression the application of stacked 
data was initially tested. The regressions followed this sequence:
• The first analysis considered all the performance variables described in equation 4;
• The second analysis excluded the cash flow analysis, so that the regression uses 
only the performance variables proposed by Liu and Stark (2009); and
• The third regression replaces the LAIR accounting variable (which is influenced by 
the accrual basis) by Operational Cash Flow (which is influenced by the cash basis).
As in the study by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), there was a large difference between the 
options paid individually and the value added generating an asymmetry in the distribution of long-
term compensation among executives. Which generates the expectation of the presence of outliers. 
The tests for normality of residues confirmed this expectation and will be presented in the analysis of 
the results, which impacted the estimation of the model by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
In order to correct the problems inherent to the model, the same solution was used by 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999): application of a robust medium quantile regression, which dis-
cards the assumption of the residues normality. In addition, the Hubber-White matrix was used 
for robust standard error. After such measurements, it was verified that the variance of the errors 
is homocedastic, allowing the continuity of the analysis.
The quantile estimation separated the sample based on the variable of interest (COMP), 
whose median in the sample was COPEL, with a value of 0.1161, in the year of 2011.
The OLS estimated values, , represent the conditional average of the depend-
ent variable. In the quantile regression, or median regression, the estimated values represent 
conditional medians of the dependent variable, presenting groups of parameters to be estimated 
in each quantile, within which the parts of the conditional distribution show different behaviors. 
This technique reduces the sum of absolute residues and generates a greater amount of informa-
tion, providing greater robustness in the analysis.
According to Koenker and Bassett (1978), since the errors do not have an ex ante defi-
nite normal distribution, the regression estimators can be more efficient than the OLS estimators. 
This paper follows a linear regression model with panel data of type:
, to i=1, ..., n and τ [0,1]         (5)
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Where,  is the dependent variable,  is a matrix n x k of covariate variables,  
is the vector k x 1 of parameters to be estimated,  is the error with a distribution that is not 
necessarily known and τ is the value of the τ-th conditional quantile of y given x. In this work, 
equation (4) was estimated, discretionally, for τ = {0.5}.
3.2 Sample definition and data collection
The sample refers to the companies listed on the BM&FBovespa and that disclosed in-
formation about executive compensation in the Reference Form between 2009 and 2012. The 
data were collected from the website of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM) 
with the use of the EmpresasNet software. Initially, 150 companies were randomly selected, but 
the availability of compensation data reduced the sample to 67 firms. Performance data (Pre-Tax 
Accounting Earnings, Operatinal Cash Flow and Market Returns) were collected at Economatica®.
4 PResentation and analysis of Results
4.1 Descriptive analysis of data
Table 1 shows the summary of the analyzed sample. According to Farmer, Archbold and 
Alexandrou (2013), the classification only in sectors facing similar risks would already be enough 
to test the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation. However, the failure to classify some 
firms into specific groups may bias the model, since its operations may not be competitive, which 
would mean that firms would not be facing the same systemic risk.
Table 1 – Concentration of sample companies by sector in 2012
SECTOR COMPANIES
Food and drinks 06
Non-cyclical consumption 05
Construction 07
Electric energy 08
Financial and others 07
Cyclical consumption 04
Comerce 06
Industrial goods 05
Basic materials 09
Textile 05
Transport and services 05
According to Homlstrom (1982) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), the greater the number 
of firms in the same industry, the more robust the hypothesis of relative performance evaluation. 
However, the limitation of available data (both transversally and longitudinally) is another aspect that 
may bias the results and also configures itself as a limiting factor of the results of this study.
With regard to data on remuneration, Table 2 presents a descriptive summary of the 
data collected. For this table the data were weighted by the size of the company (Total Asset). 
All the maximum values  are from the same company of the civil construction sector (Eternit). All 
minimum values  are from the same company in the basic materials sector (Gerdau Metalúrgica). 
The mean and median values  showed the opposite behavior in the period. While the average has 
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a tendency to decrease, the median has a slight growth tendency. On the other hand, the maxi-
mum values  have been decreasing with the passage of time, while the minimums have increased, 
which explains the behaviors of the average and the median. The standard deviation confirms 
this analysis by assuming values  that reduce systematically between the years 2010 - 2012.
Table 2 - Summary of data on the remuneration of companies belonging to the sample in R $
2012 2011 2010
Maximum  14,7274  18,6174  20,5059 
Minimum.  0,0018  0,0013  0,0022 
Mean  3,1730  3,3700  3,8888 
Median  2,4601  2,3454  2,3308 
Std. Devation  3,1172  3,6811  4,3301 
4.2 Analysis of the proposed theoretical model
 All performance variables
Table 3 presents the results of the median regression tested. It is observed in this analy-
sis that only the Weighted Market Return (RMP) and the constant were significant, all others varia-
bles presented non-significant results. On the other hand, despite being statistically significant, RMP 
showed a negative result and an absolute value close to zero, which indicates that there is no relation 
between changes in executive compensation and the performance of the weighted market return. 
This result is consistent with the findings of Liu and Stark (2009) and may be due to the lack of recom-
mendation by the capital market regulator in Brazil, similarly to what happens in the United Kingdom.
It can be affirmed, therefore, that the compensation formula of executives does not 
contemplate the weighted market return, contrary to the expectation that the compensation 
to the efforts of the executives takes into account the market performance of the sector. Conse-
quently, executives’ remuneration may contain a load of random factors that do not arise from 
the agent’s actual effort and do not exert the effect of controlling the behavior of these manag-
ers, as criticized by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
Model fit was low (R2 = 0,0212), and less than the value presented in the model of Liu and 
Stark (2009) (R2 = 0,1130) , but resembles some of the values found by Aggarwal and Samwick (1999).
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Table 3 – Test of the relative performance evaluation model considering profit, operating cash and market return
Coeficient VIF Std. Error T P > t Confidence interval 95%
RM 0.0043 1,24 0.0828 0.05 0.958 -0.1589 0.1676
RMP -0.0000 1,02 0.0000 -3.07 0.002 -0.0001 -0.0000
LAIR -0.0062 6,5 0.0311 -0.20 0.841 -0.0676 0.0551
LAIRP -0.0002 3,94 0.0029 -0.08 0.939 -0.0059 0.0055
CxOp -0.0253 5,96 0.0228 -1.11 0.268 -0.0703 0.0197
CxOpP 0.0051 2,22 0.0086 0.59 0.554 -0.0118 0.0220
Tam 0.0015 3,9 0.0015 0.96 0.341 -0.0016 0.0045
D_2012 0.0068 1,24 0.0707 0.10 0.923 -0.1326 0.1462
D_2011 -0.1067 1,22 0.0707 -1.51 0.133 -0.2462 0.0329
Constant 0.1332 0.0539 2.47 0.014 0.0269 0.2395
R2 = 0,0212 | Number of observations = 201 | Objective function = 0,1396
Subtitle: RM = Market return; RMP market-weighted return; LAIR = income before income tax and social contribution; 
LAIRP = income before income tax and social contribution weighted by sector; Cxop = operational cash; CxopP = 
operating box weighted by sector; Tam = size; D_2012: time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2012 and zero in other 
years; D_2011 = time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2011 in 0 in other years.
From the results obtained in Table 4, it is suggested that, in Brazil, risk sharing between 
Executives and Investors would not be explained by the organizational performance variables 
used in this study. This occurs in a different way in England and the United States, according to 
the studies of Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Liu and Stark (2009).
The non-sharing of risk would imply higher fixed remuneration, reducing the weight 
that the organizational performance would have on the variation of the total compensation of 
the executives of the companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA. It can be inferred that these compa-
nies choose not to use the RPE, disregarding the impacts that non-controllable effects may have 
on executive compensation elements and, consequently, on the organization’s cash flow, unlike 
the results obtained by Angelis and Gristein (2011).
The results of the time dummies allow us to infer that there were no events in the time 
interval analyzed that had any significant impact on executive compensation.
In addition, the expectation that size would influence the variation in remuneration has 
also not been confirmed. In order for this hypothesis to be validated, the remuneration weight-
ing for the size of the company should generate stationary results. However, when analyzing the 
results presented in Table 4, with those of Table 2, it is verified the occurrence of extreme values 
that impact the calculated standard deviation, and influences the results obtained.
Figure 1 shows the annual charts for the relationship between COMP and TAM. The larg-
est size values  refer to Eletrobras. It can be seen that, as previously mentioned, the relationship 
between size and variation of executive compensation is not maintained in the Brazilian market. 
One explanation for this may be the regulation of the largest companies that are part of the Bra-
zilian market, as is the case of Eletrobras itself.
On the other hand, smaller companies show greater volatility in the variation of the 
remuneration. This may be due to factors such as not being in regulated sectors, and greater risk 
assumption of managers in these entities. Another argument that may help in understanding 
these results is that smaller firms do not have the financial capacity to compete with the level of 
compensation paid by the larger ones, so they end up incorporating greater risk in their incentive 
formulas in order to attract and retain better-known executives in the market (SEEMAN, 2014).
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Figure 1 - Relation between Compensation and Size per year
 No cash-related variables
Initial tests for residue normality and heteroscedasticity were repeated at this time. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test again indicated the non-normality of residues (v = 14.236 and p-value = 
0.0000), as expected. In addition, 1% heteroscedasticity was also found. The same previous pro-
cedures were performed to solve these problems.
Table 4 presents the results for the sample without the cash variables, and again, only 
the Weighted Market Return (RMP) presents a negative coefficient and statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.0020), evidencing that it does not influence the compensation of executives.
Although we did not identify differences in the estimators when comparing with the 
previous analysis, it should be noted that there was a reduction in the explanatory power of the 
model. It is expected that this model has a better fit than the one that changes the measure of 
organizational profit-to-cash performance, due to the discretionary profitability. Specifically, the 
Pre-Tax Accounting Earnings (LAIR), as well as the Weighted Pre-Tax Accounting Earnings (LAIRP), 
do not present a statistically significant relationship with the change in executive compensation.
In the study of Liu and Stark (2009), although the relationship of these variables with the ex-
ecutives’ remuneration was statistically significant, the value of the estimator was not significant, evi-
dencing that the impact of accounting results was insignificant. In the same study was verified that the 
LAIRP was negatively related to the remuneration, evidence inverse to that identified in this research.
The fact that there is no significant relationship between the variation in the compensa-
tion and the accounting result can be due to the high proportionality of the fixed remuneration 
component of the incentive formulas for executives in companies listed on BM&FBovespa. This 
confirms the fact that companies can not share the risk of achieving results with their executives.
The consistency of the results of this study with that of Liu and Stark (2009) and Joh 
(1999) shows that firms, in defining the remuneration formulas of their executives, do not take 
into account the conclusions of Holmstrom (1982) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) who pre-
dicted profit as a good measure of performance. The main objection that the literature points 
to the use of profit is the possibility of being influenced by management decisions that do not 
necessarily represent a better result (SCOTT, 2009).
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Table 4 - Test of the relative performance evaluation model considering profit and market return
Variable Coeficient VIF Std. Error T P > t Confidence interval 95%
RM -0.0069 1,23 0.0830 -0.08 0.934 -0.1706 0.1568
RMP -0.0000 1,02 0.0000 -3.07 0.002 -0.0001 -0.0000
LAIR -0.0069 3,24 0.0204 -0.34 0.734 -0.047 0.0333
LAIRP 0.0011 3,01 0.0017 0.61 0.539 -0.0023 0.0044
Tam 0.0003 1,37 0.0008 0.32 0.746 -0.0013 0.0018
D_2012 0.0147 1,22 0.0658 0.22 0.824 -0.1151 0.1445
D_2011 -0.0931 1,17 0.0673 -1.38 0.168 -0.2258 0.0396
Constante 0.1334 0.0523 2.55 0.012 0.0302 0.2366
R2 = 0,0164 | Number of observations = 201 | Objective function = 0,1401
Subtitle: RM = Market return; RMP market-weighted return; LAIR = income before income tax and social contribution; 
LAIRP = income before income tax and social contribution weighted by sector; Cxop = operational cash; CxopP = 
operating box weighted by sector; Tam = size; D_2012: time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2012 and zero in other 
years; D_2011 = time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2011 in 0 in other years.
 No profit-related variables
In the third test, we again identified problems with normality of residues (Shapiro-Wilk 
test = 14.308 with p-value = 0.0000), and heteroscedasticity. The use of medium and robust re-
gression to outliers corrected both problems.
No change was identified regarding the statistically significant variables compared to 
previous tests. From the performance variables used in the model, only the Weighted Market 
Return (RMP) was significant at 1%, but with a negative sign. Despite the assertion by Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) that it is unclear how peer performance should be used in defining the exec-
utive incentive formula, this result indicates that the incentives paid to executives in the period 
analyzed in this study may have been adjusted to market results as explained by Liu and Stark 
(2009). However, no evidence has been found that this occurs explicitly in the incentive formulas.
In addition, the fit of the model improved versus the model that considered the LAIR / 
LAIRP and excluded the CXOP CXOPP, but once again the value was low.
Table 5 - Test of the relative performance evaluation model considering cash and market return
Coeficient VIF Std. Error T P > t Confidence Interval 95%
RM -0.0054 1,16 0.0789 -0.07 0.946 -0.1610 0.1503
RMP -0.0000 1,02 0.0000 -3.16 0.002 -0.0001 -0.0000
CxOp -0.0121 3,53 0.0174 -0.69 0.488 -0.0463 0.0222
CxOpP 0.0047 1,92 0.0087 0.54 0.592 -0.012 0.0218
Tam 0.0008 2,85 0.0014 0.54 0.589 -0.0020 0.0035
D_2012 0.0111 1,19 0.0665 0.17 0.868 -0.1201 0.1423
D_2011 -0.0937 1,13 0.0694 -1.35 0.179 -0.2306 0.0432
Constante 0.1322 0.0517 2.56 0.011 0.0303 0.2341
R2 = 0,0200 | Number of observations = 201 | Objective function = 0,1399
Subtitle: RM = Market return; RMP market-weighted return; LAIR = income before income tax and social contribution; 
LAIRP = income before income tax and social contribution weighted by sector; Cxop = operational cash; CxopP = 
operating box weighted by sector; Tam = size; D_2012: time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2012 and zero in other 
years; D_2011 = time dummy which assumes value 1 in 2011 in 0 in other years.
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According to Holmstrom (1982), the increase in the average result of a group or sector 
should reduce the impact that the result obtained in an organization exerts on the remuneration 
of its executives. This reduction would be a consequence of the expectation that the average of 
the group is high represents that part of the individual results obtained are not due to the effort 
of the executive, but a contingency that collaborated with the performance of all the organiza-
tions of that sector. Therefore, the results found for this variable do not corroborate with the 
theory of relative performance evaluation, indicating that the companies listed on the BM&F-
Bovespa did not exclude non-controllable factors in rewarding their executives for organizational 
performance in the period studied.
The variables of earnings (LAIR and LAIRP) were not significant in any period, unlike the 
findings of Liu and Stark (2009) and Joh (1999). The behavior of the CXOP and CXOPP variables did 
not change in each analysis performed. In all analyzes, the cash variables representing the individ-
ual performance of each firm presented a negative correlation, contrary to the expected results.
The market return (RM) was not relevant in any test performed similarly to the study by 
Liu and Stark (2009). Its weighting for the sector (RMP) was statistically significant at 1%, but with 
the opposite sign expected.
The control variable for size (TAM) was not statistically significant in any test. An ex-
planation for the result may be the use of quantile regression, since the separation of firms into 
quantiles would be canceling the expected effect of this variable. The temporal dummies were 
not significant, indicating that there were no exogenous effects that impacted executive compen-
sation at different times.
It was also tested the exclusion of the “Financial and other” sector, but there was no 
statistically significant change in the model. The low statistical significance of the variables and 
the low value found for their coefficients do not allow to confirm the research hypothesis that the 
sectoral and individual performance variables would have inverse directions.
It is also noticed that the non-existence of a relative performance evaluation invalidates, 
for this sample, the reaction functions of Bertrand and Cournot in the forms presented by Aggar-
wal and Samwick (1999). This implies that firms would not be reacting to market competition in 
defining their executives’ compensation formulas or that their reactions are ineffective. In this 
way, they enable a greater conflict of interests between principal and agent, which culminates in 
lower quality information for investors about the performance of executives.
5 final consideRations
The main objective of this work was to highlight the implicit use of relative performance evalu-
ation in BM&FBovespa listed companies, as a way of assessing the remuneration of its executives.
In general, it was possible to observe that only the weighted average return indicates signs 
of a relative performance evaluation, but the other variables used were not sufficient to capture ev-
idence of the implicit occurrence of the phenomenon investigated in the period analyzed (2009 - 
2012). This may be due to the non-formal recommendation by the CVM itself, and consequent lack 
of knowledge of incentive policies with explicit use of the RPE by Brazilian publicly traded companies.
Specifically, the use of cash-based performance variables (CXOP and CXOPP) increased 
the explanatory power of the model when compared to the analysis performed by replacing 
them with performance-related variables (LAIR and LAIRP). However, there was no statistically 
significant evidence of the occurrence of the relative performance evaluation. This fact leads to 
the conclusion that if there is a relative performance evaluation in the incentive formulas for the 
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executives of the firms analyzed, it only occurs through the observation of the market return that 
the sectors have earned.
The market-related performance variable (RM) was also not statistically relevant in any 
analysis, but the Weighted Market Return (RMP) was relevant at 1% and with negative corre-
lation. However, since the value of the RMP estimator was not numerically significant, it is not 
possible to say that a relative performance evaluation was identified.
Thus, it is not possible to attest to the implicit use of the Relative Results Assessment in the 
sample companies. Since the CVM does not make a formal recommendation for its use, this factor 
may be the main determinant of this finding. Research in other countries considers the explicit use 
of the RPE as a consequence of the recommendation of the SEC and the U.K. Secretary of State itself, 
which may bring about differences between their results and those found in the screen survey.
It should be noted that, due to the size of the sample itself, which has a small number of 
firms and time intervals, such results can not be generalized, which is a limitation of this research. 
In addition, there is the possibility of selection bias arising from the possibility that companies 
that choose not to disclose their information about executive compensation, are precisely those 
that the compensation would have greater sensitivity to the performance of the organization or 
the sector. Another limitation to the study is the fact that it is considerably difficult to verify the 
sensitivity of the remuneration to the performance with short periods of time. However, this 
study can contribute to discussions about the impact of the implementation of RPE on incentive 
formulas for executives of listed companies in the Brazilian market.
As a suggestion for future research it is recommended to increase the size of the sample 
in order to increase the number of companies by sector and to make more specific sectoral classi-
fications. Another recommendation is to remove from the dependent variable the long-term and 
non-pecuniary incentives, so it is expected to be able to use other estimation methods of the model.
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